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Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of winning a contestable prize. When self-
interested individuals are involved in rent seeking activities, their private returns come from 
redistribution of wealth from others rather than from wealth creation, and so the aggregate economy 
stagnates.
1 This is why rent seeking is also known as “misallocation of talent” (see Murphy et al., 
1991). At the heart of this problem, there is a public good-prisoners’ dilemma situation. 
Rent seeking occurs mainly through the public sector. The monopoly rent, which the 
government creates via coercive taxation, spending, regulation, etc, generates a prize worth 
pursuing. Focusing on rent seeking through the public sector, an important form is competition for 
privileged transfers and tax treatment, or what we call rent-seeking competition from state coffers.
2 
It is believed that the expanded size and role of the state in the post-1960 period has created a 
particularly fertile ground for such rent seeking behaviour (see e.g. Tanzi, 1998, Mueller, 2003, and 
Hillman, 2003). Among other things, this is related to the popular belief that interest groups (e.g. 
public sector unions, industrial associations, professional associations, religious groups, or even 
single companies and individuals with the right connections) compete with each other for extra 
rents at the expense of the broad public interest. 
In this paper, we incorporate rent-seeking competition from state coffers into an otherwise 
standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. We then calibrate the model to 
the euro area over the period 1980-2003. We choose to apply the model to the euro area because it 
is widely believed that rent seeking through the public sector is one of the reasons behind Europe’s 
recent poor performance (see e.g. the discussion in Heckman, 2003).
3 We thus expect that wrong 
incentives can contribute to explaining the European macroeconomic experience. We also aim to 
get quantitative evidence of the time spent on rent seeking activities and, more importantly, of the 
fraction of social resources extracted by rent seekers. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Tullock (1967, 1980), Krueger (1974), Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991). For a review of the literature 
on rent seeking, see Mueller (2003, chapter 15) and Hillman (2003, chapter 6). 
2 It is useful to divide privileges into two categories. The first category includes privileged transfers and tax treatment. 
There are direct transfers in cash (e.g. targeted subsidies and other benefits) and non-cash (e.g. private use of public 
assets and extra health services). There are also indirect transfers (e.g. measures that increase the demand for an interest 
group’s services) and disguised transfers (e.g. a public road may be planned to increase the value of certain pieces of 
real estate). Also there are measures that reduce tax burdens (e.g. tax exemptions and loopholes designed to favor 
special interests) coupled with a rise in the average tax rate to make up for the lost revenues. The second category 
includes privileged regulation and legislation that reduce competition (e.g. government-created barriers to entry, trade 
restrictions like tariffs and agricultural price supports). Obviously, this list is not exhaustive (see Tanzi, 1998, Mueller, 
2003, chapter 15, and Hillman, 2003, chapter 6, for more examples). Our model can capture the first category. Note that 
rent seeking can also take illegal forms (e.g. use of fake documents to get a privileged treatment).  
3 See also articles in the economic press like The Economist.   2
A key feature of our model is that the state collects (income and consumption) tax revenues 
to finance public investment, public consumption and lump-sum transfers, but then each self-
interested (i.e. utility-maximizing) individual uses a part of his his/her non-leisure (i.e. effort) time 
to extract a fraction of these revenues for his/her own personal benefit. The amount extracted by 
each individual is proportional to the effort he/she allocates to rent seeking relative to the total effort 
allocated to rent seeking by all individuals. In equilibrium, the total amount extracted from state 
coffers increases with per capita economy-wide rent seeking efforts. This redistributive struggle 
hurts the macro-economy both directly and indirectly: the direct effect arises because there are less 
resources available to finance public infrastructure and other socially useful services; the indirect 
effect arises because the possibility of extraction distorts individuals’ incentives by pushing them 
away from productive work. Both effects reduce the prize that initiated the struggle in the first 
place. 
We calibrate the model both to the euro area as a whole and to each individual EU-12 
country (the European countries that have adopted the euro). The main results are as follows. Our 
model economy does well in reproducing the key stylized facts of the euro area without seriously 
failing in any aspect. Moreover, it scores better than the standard RBC model in terms of labor 
volatility, which is a statistic that the RBC model finds it difficult to match. This happens because 
rent seeking works as a substitute for work and leisure, which - in case of a shock - helps to produce 
a response of non-leisure time stronger than in standard RBC models. Our model also scores much 
better than a model with a public sector but without rent seeking. Concerning long-run values of the 
fraction of tax revenues grabbed by rent seekers, this is found to be  % 27 . 17  for the euro area as a 
whole. At individual country level, the Netherlands scores the best with only 4.3%, while Greece is 
the worst with 34.89% of tax revenues taken away being followed by Portugal, Italy and Belgium 
with 20.2%, 18.48% and 17.37% respectively. Finally, our impulse response functions reveal that a 
larger size of the public sector signals a larger pie pushing individuals to devote more of their time 
to rent seeking, and that this is ceteris paribus bad for macro performance. 
In addition to the above economic arguments and quantitative results, a methodological 
contribution is the inclusion of a redistributive struggle (rent seeking competition) in a DSGE setup. 
Although the RBC methodology has been used by several authors to incorporate “non-Walrasian” 
features (see e.g. Danthine and Donaldson, 1995), here we use this parsimonious methodology to 
study a political economy phenomenon. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. A quantitative 
study of the euro area is in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical model  
 
There is a large number of identical households and (for simplicity) an equal number of 
identical firms. Households own capital and labour and rent them to firms. They are also engaged in 
rent seeking competition with each other for extra fiscal privileges.
4 Rent seeking comes at a private 
cost.
5 Here, it requires time and effort. Thus, in addition to consumption and saving, each household 
also chooses optimally how to allocate its non-leisure time between productive work and rent 
seeking activities.
6 Firms produce an homogenous product by using capital, labour and public 
infrastructure. The government uses income and consumption taxes and also issues bonds in order 
to finance three activities: the provision of public consumption goods and services that provide 
direct utility to households, the provision of public investment that augments the stock of public 
infrastructure and provides production externalities to firms, and lump-sum transfers that augment 
households’ income. However, a fraction of collected tax revenue can be depleted by rent seekers. 
Thus, in our paper, the contestable prize is the monopoly rent that the government creates 
via coercive taxation. In turn, self-interested agents use their private resources (time, effort, 
initiative) to compete with each other for a share of this prize.
7 
Also note that each household can receive both a lump-sum transfer and an extra fiscal 
favour. The former is standard and reflects the idea that there are government programs independent 
of interest groups’ pressure and lobbying (this can be related to social and political norms). The 
latter depends on the effort individuals spend in rent seeking activities and reflects the idea that 
some transfers - especially those targeted to more narrow groups - are provided only if the 
beneficiaries of those transfers apply pressure as a group.
8  
In what follows, we solve the problems of individual households and firms and then the 
associated decentralized competitive equilibrium. This is for any feasible policy. Individuals are 
rational. Time is discrete and infinite.  
                                                 
4 We can assume that firms also rent seek like households. This is not important because households are also firm-
owners in this class of models. We could also assume that government officials rent seek. This is trickier if government 
officials act optimally. But here we solve for any feasible policy (i.e. policy is exogenous). See the last section 4 for a 
discussion.     
5 Membership in trade unions, participation in strikes and demonstrations, lobbying, bribing, paying lawyers, campaign 
contributions, etc, are costly activities. In general, rent seeking (winning a contestable prize) requires the expenditure of 
private resources. As said already, rent seeking implies social costs too. 
6 This goes back to Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991), Grossman and Kim (1996) and many others, where 
individuals decide how to allocate their activities between socially productive ones (e.g. work, innovation, 
entrepreneurship) and socially unproductive ones (e.g. rent seeking, poaching, breaking the law). 
7 See also e.g. Mohtadi and Roe (2003), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005) for similar form of rent seeking. We could 
assume that the contestable prize is government expenditure, or that it also includes income from the issue of bonds; 
this is not important in a general equilibrium model. 
8 See e.g. Mueller (2003, chapter 21) and Hillman (2003, chapter 6) for a survey of the literature on interest groups, 
transfers and the size of the government. See also Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 7) for special-interest politics.    4
 
2.1 Households 
Each period t there are  t N  identical households indexed by the superscript h, where 
t N h ,..., 2 , 1 = . The population size,  t N , evolves at a constant rate  1 ≥ n γ  so that  t n t N N γ = +1 , 
where 0 0 > N  is given. 
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where  0 E  denotes rational expectations conditional on the information set available at time zero, 
1 0
* < < β  is a time discount factor, 
h
t C  is h’s  private consumption at time t, 
c
t G  is average (per 
household) public consumption goods and services provided by the government at t,
9 and 
h
t L  is 
h’s leisure time at t. Thus, public consumption goods and services influence private utility through 
the value of the parameter ψ ; when  0 > ψ  (resp.  0 < ψ ), the marginal utility of 
h
t C  decreases 






























L G C u  (2) 
 
where 1 0 < < µ  and  0 ≥ σ  are standard parameters.  
Each household h saves in the form of capital, 
h
t I , and government bonds, 
h
t D . It receives 
interest income from accumulated capital, 
kh
tt rK, and government bonds, 
bh
tt rB, where 
k
t r  and 
b
t r  
are respectively the gross returns to inherited capital and bonds, 
h
t K   and 
h
t B . The household has 
one unit of time in each period and divides it between leisure, 
h
t L , and effort,  
h
t H . Thus, in each 




t H L . It further divides its non-leisure time 
h
t H , between productive work, 
                                                 




t N G G / ≡ , where 
c
t G  is total public consumption services.  
10 See also e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). When  0 > ψ , public and private consumption are substitutes (e.g. 
private security and state police). When  0 < ψ , public and private consumption are complements (e.g. low quality 
public education requires additional time and money for private tuition). When  0 = ψ , the household’s preferences are 
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t η  are 
respectively the fractions of non-leisure time that the household allocates to productive work and 
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a share of profits, 
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t Π , and a share of lump sum government transfers, 
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where 1 0 < ≤
c
t τ  and  1 0 < ≤
y
t τ  are respectively consumption and income tax rates common to all 
agents,
12  t w  is the wage rate,  t Z  is labour-augmenting technology common to all households that 
evolves at a constant rate  1 ≥ z γ  so that  t z t Z Z γ = +1  where  0 0 > Z  is given,  t R  is total government 
tax income (specified below) and 0 1 t ≤∆ <  is the economy-wide degree of extraction (specified 
below). Note that  t R  and  t ∆  are taken as given by each individual.  
The budget constraint in (3) is standard except from the last term on the right-hand side. The 
idea behind this term is that a total amount  tt R ∆  can be taken away from the government (i.e.  tt R ∆  
is the contestable prize) and then each self-interested agent attempts to extract a fraction of that pie, 
where the fraction depends on the amount of time and effort that an individual agent allocates to 
rent seeking relative to the time and effort allocated by all agents in the society. This is a standard 
rent-seeking technology (see e.g. Murphy et al., 1991, Mauro, 2004, Park et al., 2005, and for a 
survey Mueller, 2003, chapter 15; this is also the usual way of modeling extraction in the natural 
resources literature, see e.g. Dasgupta and Heal, 1979).   
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where initial  0
h B  is given. 
Private holding of capital evolves according to: 
 
                                                 




t N G G / ≡ , where 
t
t G  is total lump-sum transfers. 
12 We assume that returns on government bonds are not taxed.    6
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where the parameter  1 0 < <
p δ  is a depreciation rate, initial  0
h K  is given, and the parameter  0 ≥ ξ  
captures internal adjustment costs on gross investment.. This specification ensures that there are no 
adjustment costs in the long run.   
Households act competitively by taking prices, policy and economy-wide variables as 
given.
13 Thus, each household h chooses  11 0 {, , , , }
hh h h h
tt t t t t CH K B η
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Condition (6a) is the optimality condition with respect to effort time, 
h
t H , and equates the marginal 
value of leisure to the after-tax return to effort. Condition (6b) is the optimality condition with 
respect to the fraction of non-leisure time allocated to work vis-à-vis rent seeking, 
h
t η . It implies 
that the return to work and the return to rent seeking should be equal in equilibrium. The next two 
                                                 
13 We could assume that each household  h  internalizes the effects of his/her own actions on aggregate outcomes. This 
is not important. What is important is that each h  takes the actions of other agents  h j ≠  as given.         7
conditions, (6c) and (6d), are standard Euler equations for  1
h
t K +  and  1
h
t B + . The optimality conditions 
are completed by the transversality conditions for the two assets, namely  0
) (.
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2.2 Firms 
There are as many firms as households. Identical firms are indexed by the superscript  f , 
where 1,2,..., t f N = . Each firm produces an homogeneous product, 
f
t Y , by using private capital, 
f
t K , private labor, 
f
t Q , and average (per firm) public capital, 
g
t K . Its production function is: 
 
ε α ε α − − =








t K Q K A Y  (7) 
 
where 0 > t A  is stochastic total productivity (see below for its law of motion) and  1 , 0 < < ε α  are 
parameters (see also e.g. Lansing, 1998, for a similar production function with constant returns to 
scale at the economy level). 
Firms act competitively by taking prices, policy and economy-wide variables as given. 
Thus, each firm  f  chooses 
f
t K  and 
f
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t Y ) 1 ( ε α − − = Π  per firm.  
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2.3 Government budget constraint  
Each period the government issues bonds,  1 + t B , and taxes consumption as well as income 
(from capital, labour and profits) at the rates  1 0 < ≤
c
t τ  and  1 0 < ≤
y
t τ  respectively. If rent seekers 
manage to take away a fraction 0 1 t ≤∆ <  of collected tax revenue  t R , then only a fraction 
0( 1 )1 t <− ∆≤  of  t R  remains in the hands of the government. On the expenditure side, the 
government provides public consumption 
c
t G , public investment 
i
t G , and  transfer payments 
t
t G . 
The budget constraint is: 
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where 0 1
g δ <<  is a depreciation rate and initial 0
g K  is given. 
 
2.4 Exogenous stochastic variables and policy instruments   
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where  0 A ,
c y t i c s s s 0 0 0 0 0 , , , , τ τ  are means of the stochastic processes;  a ρ , c y t i g ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ , , , ,  are first-












t ε ε ε ε ε , , , ,  are i.i.d. shocks. 
 
2.5 Economy-wide extraction  
To close the model, we need to specify the economy-wide degree of extraction (0 1 t ≤ ∆<). 
Following e.g. Zak and Knack (2001), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005), we assume that  t ∆  
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 (13) 
where the parameter  0 0 ≥ ∆  can be thought of as a technology parameter that translates individual 
rent-seeking efforts into actual extraction. The value of  0 ∆  reflects social norms (see below 
subsection 3.3. for details). 
 
2.6 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) 
In a Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE): (i) Each individual household and each 
individual firm maximize respectively their own utility and profit by taking as given market prices, 
government policy and economy-wide outcomes. (ii) Markets clear via price flexibility.
14 (iii) 
Individual decisions are consistent with economy-wide decisions. (iv) The government budget 
constraint is satisfied. (v) This equilibrium holds for any feasible policy. We will solve for a 
symmetric DCE. Equilibrium quantities will be denoted by letters without the superscripts h 
(which was used to indicate quantities chosen by households) and  f  (which was used to indicate 
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 in the bond market.   10
quantities chosen by firms). Obviously, since atomistic individuals have ignored externalities, the 
DCE is inefficient (see Park et al., 2005, for details).   
Equations (1)-(13) give a DCE. Looking ahead at the long run where all the components of 
the national income identity should grow at the same constant rate (the so-called balanced growth 
rate), we transform these components in per capita and efficient unit terms to make them stationary. 
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We therefore have nine equations in the paths of  1 1 1 , , , , , , , , + + + t
g
t t t t
b
t t t t k k b h r y c i η . This is for 
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2.7 Linearized Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium   
We linearize the DCE in (14a)-(14i) around its long run (the latter is presented in Appendix 
A). Define  ) ln (ln ˆ x x x t t − ≡ , where x is the model consistent long-run value of a variable  t x . It is 
then straightforward to show that we end up with a system  [ ] 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 1 1 0 1 1 = + + + + + z B z B x A x A E t t t t , 
where  [] ′ ≡ t t
g
t t t t
b










t t t s s s A z τ τ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ˆ  and 
0 1 0 1 , , , B B A A  are constant matrices of dimension 10x10, 10x10, 10x6 and 10x6 respectively. The 
elements of  t z ˆ  follow the  ) 1 ( AR  processes in (12a)-(12f) above. Thus, we end up with a linear first-
order stochastic difference equation system in ten variables, out of which three are predetermined 
( t
g
t t k k b ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ) and seven are jump ( t t t
b
t t t t k h r y c i 2 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ η ). To solve it, we use the solution 
methodology in Klein (2000). We report that, when we use the calibrated values presented below, 
there are three eigenvalues with absolute value less than one, so that the model exhibits saddlepath 
stability. We also report that all eigenvalues are real. 
 
3. Empirical Results  
 
We first calibrate the model to the euro zone area as a whole. Our data source is the 
(updated) AWM dataset constructed by Fagan et al. (2001). The data are quarterly and cover the 
period 1980:1-2003:4.
15 We also calibrate the model to individual EU-12 countries. In this case, we 
use annual data from the OECD Economic Outlook database. For comparison, we will also report 
some results for the US economy. 
 
3.1 Calibration and long-run solution for the euro zone  
Tables 1 and 2 below report calibration results, the long run solution and average values 
implied by the AWM dataset. Concerning the tax rates in Table 1, we use the ECFIN effective tax 
rates for the euro zone as reported in Martinez-Mongay (2001). The average (annual) income and 
                                                 
15 This dataset starts in 1970. We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) in using data after 1980.   12
consumption tax rates, 
y
0 τ  and 
c
0 τ , over the period 1980-2001 are  3717 . 0  and  2372 . 0  
respectively.
16 Table 2 reports average values for  y c/ a n d   y i/ , while the average quarterly real 
interest rate, 
b r , is  0089 . 0  which means an annual value of  036 . 0 . The series of non-leisure time, 
t h , is computed as in Correia et al. (1995).
17 
Tables 1 and 2 here 
Some parameter values in Table 1 are set on the basis of a priori information. Following 
usual practice, the curvature parameter in the utility function, σ , is set equal to 2. The parameter 
ψ , which measures the degree of substitutability/complementarity between private and public 
consumption in the utility function, is set equal to 0  (we experiment with other values too). We 
assume away population growth by setting  1 = n γ . The private and public capital depreciation rates, 
p δ  and 
g δ , are both set equal to 0.01 (this is a quarterly value implying 0.04 annually), which are 
the values used in the AWM for the construction of the series for private and public capital. The 
exponent of public capital in the production function ( ε α − − 1 ) is set equal to  0295 . 0 , which is the 
average public investment to output ratio, 
i s0 , in the data (Baxter and King, 1993, do the same for 
the US). The parameter measuring capital adjustment costs, ξ , is set equal to zero (this is the value 
so that our simulated series of private investment mimics as close as possible the data in terms of 
volatility).   
Both  0 Z  (the initial level of technical progress) and  0 A  (the level of long run aggregate 
productivity) are scale parameters and are normalized to one (see also e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999, 
p. 954). The growth rate of the exogenous labor augmenting technology,  z γ , is found to be 
0064 . 1 = z γ .
18 
The time discount factor, β , is calibrated from equation (A.III) in Appendix A. The capital 
share, α , is calibrated from equation (A.II). Given the values of α  and  ε α − − 1 , the labor share is 
6391 . 0 = ε . No data is available for the fraction of non-leisure time devoted to productive work 
                                                 
16 Martinez-Mongay (2001) reports annual country-specific and weighted euro zone averages of the effective tax rates 
on labour income, capital income and consumption (we use, respectively, the LITR, KITN and CETR rates). These 
effective tax rates are based on the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994). Our income tax rate is then obtained as 
*( 1 ) *
y LITR KITN τε ε =+ − .  
17 Total employment is equal to the employment rate multiplied by the labour force. On the assumption that there are 
7x14 hours per week and the average working week is 40 hour, labour hours are obtained if we multiply total 
employment by the factor 40/(7x14). 
18 The AWM database reports two growing productivity series, namely real trend total factor productivity and labour 
productivity. In our model we have only one exogenous growing productivity variable,  t Z . Hence, we construct a 
series  t Z  whose growth rate reflects the growth rate of both aforementioned series, as implied by our production 
function. This gives  z γ =1.0064.    13
relative to rent seeking, η , or the fraction of collected tax revenues extracted by rent seekers, ∆ . 
We therefore calibrate the value of η  from equations (A.I), (A.VI) and (A.VIII). This gives 
8098 . 0 = η . The extraction parameter  0 ∆  is also calibrated from (A.I), (A.VI) and (A.VIII). In turn, 
given the calibrated values of η  and  0 ∆ , we get  1861 . 0 = ∆ . The weight given to consumption 
relative to leisure in the utility function, µ , is calibrated from (A.III). Note that this is the only 
parameter value that changes with the value of ψ .
19 Finally, the chosen values of  z γ , 
p δ  and 
g δ  
yield from (A.IX) and (A.VII) respectively the values  0172 . 11 / = y k  and  7936 . 1 / = y k
g  for the 
two capital stocks as shares of output.
20   
For the simulations, we also need to specify the parameters (autoregressive coefficients and 
variances) of the stochastic exogenous processes in (12a)-(12f). The coefficients  t i g ρ ρ ρ , ,  and the 
associated standard deviations,  t i g σ σ σ , , , in (12b)-(12d) are estimated via OLS from their 
respective ) 1 ( AR  processes. Following usual practice (see e.g. McCallum, 1989), we choose the 
volatility of the Solow residual,  a σ , so that the actual and simulated series for GDP have the same 
variance. By the same token, we choose the persistence of the Solow residual,  a ρ , so that our 
simulated series of output mimics as close as possible the first-order autocorrelation of the actual 
series of output. This is achieved when  0063 . 0 = a σ  and  99 . 0 = a ρ  respectively. Finally, we 
choose to treat 
y
t τ  and 
c
t τ  in (12e)-(12f) as constant over time. This can be justified by the lack of 
quarterly data and by the observation that the tax rates change infrequently via tax reforms rather 
than continuously (see the discussion in King and Rebelo, 1999). Table 1 summarizes all these 
results. 
Table 2 also presents the long-run equilibrium solution as derived in Appendix A. In this 
solution, we have set the annual long-run public debt to output ratio to be  6 . 0 , or 2.4 on a quarterly 
basis, which is the target of the Stability and Growth Pact. For this reason we allow the long-run 
public consumption to output ratio, 
c s0 , to follow residually to satisfy the government budget 
constraint (see again Appendix A for details). It is worth noting that this solution, for the euro zone 
as a whole, gives  8206 . 0 = η  and  1727 . 0 = ∆ . That is, in the long run of this economy, individual 
agents allocate  % 94 . 17  of their non-leisure time to rent seeking activities, and as a result they grab 
% 27 . 17  of collected tax revenue. 
 
                                                 
19 For ψ =[-1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1], we get γ =[0.3499, 0.4078, 0.4562, 0.4973, 0.5327].  
20 The AWM database does not report data on private and public capital. We choose to calibrate the two long-run 
capital output ratios rather than construct the respective series using e.g. a perpetual inventory method.   14
3.2 Sensitivity analysis of the long run solution for the euro zone  
We use the long-run solution to report comparative static properties. We focus on the 
behavior of  1 0 ≤ <η  and how it is affected by the government spending-tax variables. Actually, as 
shown in Appendix A, the long run value of η  is a function of 
c y i c s s 0 0 0 0 , , , τ τ  and parameter values 
only. Numerical simulations shown in Table 3 reveal that an increase in any of 
c y i c s s 0 0 0 0 , , , τ τ  leads to 
a monotonic decrease in η  (at least in the range of parameter values we work with). In other words, 
as the size of the public sector increases (anyhow this is measured), there is a signal of a larger pie 
so that selfish individuals find it optimal to devote more time to rent seeking relative to work (see 
Park et al., 2005, for further discussion). Note that these long-run results are qualitatively similar to 
those implied by the impulse response functions studied below. 
Table 3 here 
 
3.3 Calibration and long-run solution for individual euro countries 
To calibrate the model for each individual country, we follow exactly the same steps as for 
the average euro area. We use annual data from the OECD Economic Outlook database over the 
same period, namely 1980-2003 (some details about the data are provided in Appendix B).
21 
Table 4 presents the calibrated value of  0 ∆  and the long run solutions of η  and ∆ for each 
country.
22 For comparison, we also provide three relevant “real world” indexes: two measures of the 
size of shadow economy as a percentage of GDP obtained from Schneider and Enste (2000), as well 
as the ICRG index which is a widely used measure of institutional quality.
23 Numbers in 
parentheses denote the ranking of countries with bigger numbers indicating worse performance.  
Table 4 here 
The parameter  0 ∆  provides a measure of institutional quality (the higher is  0 ∆ , the easier a 
given rent seeking effort is translated into actual extraction). Conceptually,  0 ∆  tells the same story 
as the ICRG index. The correlation between our calibrated value of  0 ∆  and the ICRG index is -0.84 
(higher numbers of the ICRG index denote better outcomes, hence the minus). Moreover, the 
ranking of countries according to  0 ∆  is close to the ranking of countries according to the ICRG 
index. Apart from small differences, both measures classify countries into the same two subgroups. 
Using  0 ∆ , in the “good” subgroup, Finland scores the best being closely followed by Austria and 
the Netherlands. In the “bad” subgroup, Greece is clearly the worst with Portugal being the second-
worst. 
                                                 
21 For Germany, we use data for the post-unification period, 1990-2003, only. 
22 Details and calibration results for each country are in Angelopoulos (2006). 
23 For details, see the notes in Table 4.       15
Consider now our results for ∆ (the share of total tax revenue eventually grabbed by rent 
seekers). The Netherlands scores the best, while Greece again is the worst with 34.89% of tax 
revenues taken away. To us, who live the Greek experience, this number is not surprising. Portugal, 
Italy and Belgium are the second-, third- and fourth-worst with 20.2%, 18.48% and 17.37% 
respectively. The results for the other countries also make sense. An exception is Spain, which 
scores paradoxically well relative to the rankings implied by the shadow economy and ICRG 
indexes as well as by  0 ∆  (see below for further discussion).  
Note that although ∆ and the shadow economy indexes refer to different things (rent 
seeking can take legal forms, while shadow economic activities are mainly illegal), it is interesting 
to note that countries with rent seeking problems also suffer from shadow economic activities. It is 
also interesting to note that the group of countries with severe rent seeking (i.e. Greece, Portugal, 
Italy and Belgium) is also the group with high public debt-to-GDP ratios.   
Finally, we report that we have also calibrated the model to US data over the same period, 
1980-2003, using annual data from the OECD (some details about the data are in Appendix B). 
Following exactly the same steps as above, we find that both the calibrated value, as well as the 
long-run equilibrium solution, of η  are practically one. Thus, according to our model, there is no 
evidence of rent seeking activities in the US. We believe this is consistent with the view that, if 
there is rent seeking in the US, it may happen through different channels, for instance through 
regulation, and not through spending/tax. A similar argument might also apply to the paradoxically 
low value of ∆ found for Spain. Or, more possibly, and this is irrespectively of rent seeking, it is 
natural that a single model cannot account for each one of all these different countries.  
 
3.4 Simulation results for the euro zone  
In the rest of the paper, we continue with results for the euro area as a whole. We simulate 
our model economy over the period 1980-2003 and evaluate its descriptive power by comparing the 
second moment properties of the series generated by the model to those of the actual eurozone data. 
We will report results for the parameterization in Table 1. For comparison, we will also report the 
performance of two other models: (i) the same model without rent seeking (i.e.  1 = η  and hence 
0 = ∆ ); (ii) the baseline RBC model which is without public sector and without rent seeking (see 
e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999).
24 To get the cyclical component of the series, we first take logarithms 
(except otherwise stated) and then apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 
1600 for both the simulated and the actual data. We study the volatility, persistence and co-
movement properties of some key variables, specifically  h h y h i c y η η, , / , , , ,.    
                                                 
24 See Canova (2006) for a recent rich review of the DSGE literature.    16
Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarize, respectively, results for standard deviation (relative to that of 
output), first-order autocorrelation and cross-correlation with output. This is done both for the 
simulated series and the actual data.  
We start with relative volatility. Inspection of Table 5 reveals that our model does quite well 
in predicting the standard deviation of the key macroeconomic variables relative to that of output. 
Our model is somewhat better than the other two models in terms of consumption. More 
importantly, our model clearly outperforms the other two models in terms of labour.  
Table 5 here 
Recall that one of the weak points of the baseline RBC model is its difficulty with the labour 
market in general, and specifically its prediction that the hours worked are not enough volatile 
relative to output (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999, and Hall, 1999, for rich surveys). Of course, to 
increase the standard deviation of labour and so match the data, one could be tempted to simply use 
larger labour supply elasticity with respect to real wages. But this is not a way around because the 
typical elasticity implied by the baseline model is already at odds (too high) with the elasticity 
implied by microeconomic evidence. The RBC literature has therefore recognized the need for 
alternative resolutions, which can predict a higher labour volatility and at the same time smaller 
labour supply elasticity. Rent seeking does exactly this. By distinguishing between effort time 
devoted to productive work,  t th η , and effort time devoted to rent seeking,  t t h ) 1 ( η − , we move the 
model economy to the right direction vis-à-vis the data.
25 This happens because, once there is a 
shock, the fraction of effort time devoted to productive work,  t η , and the total time devoted to 
productive work,  t th η , move in opposite directions, so that total effort or non-leisure time,  t h , has 
to overshoot its value relative to the standard RBC model (the channel becomes clear when we 
present impulse response functions in the next subsection below). This overshooting is reflected 
into higher labour volatility.    
It is worth saying that the literature has always recognized the need for amplification 
mechanisms that help to produce a response of employment to a driving force stronger than in the 
baseline RBC model. The same literature has pointed out that one way to do so is to introduce a 
third use of time - in addition to work and leisure - that helps the model to come closer to a realistic 
explanation of employment volatility (again see King and Rebelo, 1999, and Hall, 1999). Our rent 
seeking activity plays this very role of a third use of time. Alternative third uses of time could be 
home production (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 1995) and human capital services (see e.g. Jones et al., 
2005). 
                                                 
25 Our full model implies a λ -constant (Frisch labour supply) wage elasticity of 1.2661. By contrast, in our case, the 
basic RBC model implies 1.63. The model without rent seeking implies a wage elasticity of 1.14 and fails to match 
labour volatility. Thus, the full story (with a public sector and rent seeking) helps with the data.    17
We continue with persistence results reported in Table 6. All three models do well by 
predicting high persistence, although not as high as observed in the data (except for that of  h y/  
which is well-matched by all three models). The result that rent seeking does not affect the 
persistence behaviour is not surprising: the way we have modelled rent seeking does not add any 
new mechanism through which shocks propagate their effects over time. 
Table 6 here 
Concerning cross-correlations with output, as can be seen in Table 7, all three models give 
similar results. They all do well in terms of sign, and to some extent magnitude, although predicted 
contemporaneous cross-correlation coefficients are higher than in the data.  
Table 7 here 
To summarize, our model economy does well in reproducing several of the key stylized 
facts of the euro economy without seriously failing in any aspect. Moreover, it scores clearly better 
than the other models (namely, the basic RBC model and the model with public sector but without 
rent seeking) in terms of labor volatility. The latter is a statistic that the basic RBC model finds it 
difficult to match. The model with public sector but without rent seeking is the relatively worst.   
 
3.5 Impulse response functions for the euro zone  
We finally compute the responses of the key endogenous variables (measured as deviations 
from their model-consistent long run value) to a unit shock to the exogenous processes. We focus 
on shocks to total factor productivity, government consumption and government investment. 
Results are reported in Tables 8a-c respectively.  
Tables 8a-c here 
Table 8a reports the effects of a temporary shock to total factor productivity,  t A . An 
increase in  t A  signals a larger contestable pie and pushes individuals to devote a larger fraction of 
their effort time to rent seeking ( t η  falls initially). As a result,  t h  has to rise more relatively to 
standard DSGE models. The full scenario is as follows. As is typical in DSGE models, an increase 
in  t A  increases both current and - via the consumption smoothing channel - future consumption. 
Leisure, both current and future, has the tendency to follow consumption, namely to rise (i.e.  t h  to 
fall). Nevertheless, a higher  t A  raises labor productivity and the real wage (as well as output, 
investment and capital) and creates a substitution effect that works in opposite direction by 
increasing the time spent in productive work,  t th η . If the latter effect dominates, the net effect on 
t th η  is positive. This is what happens here (see also e.g. Kollintzas and Vassilatos, 2000). In   18
addition, since  t η  has fallen,  t h  has to rise more relatively to the typical DSGE model in order to 
support the higher value of  t th η   
Table 8b reports the effects of a temporary shock to government consumption as a share of 
output, 
c
t s . An increase in 
c
t s  (like an increase in  t A ) signals a larger pie pushing individuals to 
devote a larger fraction of their effort time to rent seeking ( t η  falls). At the same time, an increase 
in 
c
t s  creates a negative income effect that reduces consumption (see also e.g. Canova, 2006). 
Concerning leisure, there are two opposite effects: on the one hand, leisure tends to fall by 
following consumption; on the other hand, a higher 
c
t s  lowers the wage rate (as well as output, 
investment and capital) and creates a substitution effect that tends to increase leisure. Here the 
former effect dominates so that leisure falls or equivalently total effort-time ( t h ) rises. Since  t η  has 
fallen, the time spent in productive work,  t th η , rises by less than total  t h . 
Table 8c reports the effects of a temporary shock to government investment as a share of 
output, 
i
t s . The response of the economy to an increase in the share of GDP that goes to public 
investment is more complicated than the corresponding response to an increase in the share that 
goes to government consumption. The qualitative effects on  t η ,  t th η  and  t h  are the same, but now 
the resulting increase in public capital increases the marginal productivities of all private factors. As 
a result, while the response of the economy to a change in 
i
t s  in the very short run resembles that of 
a change in 
c
t s , eventually private consumption, investment and capital all rise above their initial 
long run values. Output is also higher all the time contrary to what happened with an increase in 
c
t s . 
 
4. Concluding remarks and possible extensions   
 
The present paper has incorporated rent-seeking competition from state coffers into a 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model. It then used the RBC methodology to calibrate the 
model to the euro area over the period 1980-2003. The main result is that rent seeking incentives 
matter to the macro economy in Europe. We also managed to get quantitative evidence for the 
fraction of social resources taken away by rent seeking interest groups. 
We close with two possible extensions. First, it is interesting to include government 
expenditure on law enhancing activities (police, courts, tax inspectors, prisons, etc) and examine its 
quantitative implications. If this reduces rent seeking (this could happen by decreasing  0 ∆  in (13) 
above), it will help the aggregate economy. Second, here we assumed that only private agents rent 
seek from state coffers. To the extent that we solved for any feasible policy (namely, policy was   19
exogenous), this assumption was not really important. The strategic role of government officials, 
and their interaction with private agents concerning extraction from state coffers, will become 
important the moment government officials’ behaviour is optimally chosen. But endogenizing 
policy in a DSGE model is beyond the aim of this paper. At this stage, we would just like to 
speculate that, although this would complicate the model considerably, adding more types of rent 
seeking optimising agents would not change our qualitative results. Government officials are also 
“human beings” that behave atomistically like private agents.   
   20
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Long-run equilibrium of (14a)-(14i) 
In the long run, there are no shocks and variables remain constant. Thus,  x x x x t t t ≡ = = − + 1 1 ,  
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z n = + − δ γ γ 1  (A.IX) 
which is a system in 
b g r b h i k c k y , , , , , , , , η . Notice that if we set  y b 4 . 2 =  (i.e. the public debt-to-
GDP ratio is 60% on an annual basis, which is supposed to be the EU case in the long run), then one 
of the other five policy instruments should follow residually to satisfy the government budget 
constraint (A.VI). In that case, we choose the long-run government consumption-to-GDP ratio (
c s0) 
to play this role. 
It is straightforward to show that the above equations (A.I)-(A.IX) give a unique closed-
form solution (details available on request). Here, we only report the solution for η , i.e. the fraction 
of non-leisure time allocated to work vis-à-vis rent seeking: 
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Appendix B: Data for individual countries  
For individual EU-12 countries, we use annual data from the OECD Economic Outlook. 
Concerning the depreciation rates and the growth rate of the labor augmenting technology, we set 
(on annual basis)  04 . 0 = =
g p δ δ  and  1.026 z γ =  for each country (as we did for the euro area as a 
whole). Concerning tax rates, we again use the ECFIN effective tax rates for each country as 
reported in Martinez-Mongay (2001). For the real government interest rate, we use the “benchmark 
risk free” Treasury bill interest rate as implied by the World Bank’s database World Development 
Indicators (the source is the IFS). Since this is not available for Austria and Finland, we use the euro 
zone value of  036 . 0  annually for these two countries. With respect to labor hours (h), we use data 
for average hours of work per week when available in the OECD Economic Outlook database. 
Since such data are not available for Austria, Greece and Portugal, for these countries, we work as 
in the euro zone above. Finally, for those countries with an average annual public debt-to-GDP ratio 
( y b/ ) higher than 0.6, we set  6 . 0 / = y b  and let 
c s0 to be endogenously determined in the long run, 
as explained in Appendix A above. For those countries with an average public debt-to-GDP ratio 
lower than 0.6, 
c s0  is given by the data average and   y b/  follows.   
For the US economy, we also use annual data from OECD (we have also used quarterly data 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, but the long-run results are very similar to those 
obtained from OECD data). Following King and Rebelo (1999), we set  10 . 0 = =
g p δ δ . We also 
set 1.029 z γ =  (which is the average growth rate of the US real GDP for this time period). We again 
use the ECFIN effective tax rates as reported in Martinez-Mongay (2001).  
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description value  source 
α   private capital share in production  0.3314  calibrated from (A.II) 
ε   labor share in production  0.6391  calibrated as 
i s0 1 − −α  
p δ   private capital quarterly depreciation rate  0.0100  set 
g δ   public capital quarterly depreciation rate  0.0100  set 
0 A   long run aggregate productivity  1  set 
z γ   growth rate of labor augmenting technology  1.0064  constructed data 
ξ   capital adjustment cost parameter  0  set 
y k /   private capital to output ratio  11.0172 calibrated from (A.IX) 
y k
g /  public capital to output ratio  1.7936  calibrated from (A.VII) 
µ   consumption weight in utility function  0.4562  calibrated from (A.III) 
σ   curvature parameter in utility function  2  set 
n γ   population growth rate  1  set 
β   time discount factor  0.9912  calibrated from (A.III) 
ψ   substitutability between private and public 
consumption in utility  0 set 
n  fraction of non-leisure time allocated to 
productive work  0.8098  calibrated from (A.I), 
(A.VI), (A.VIII) 
nh  time allocated to productive work  0.3007  derived from n and h 
∆   economy-wide degree of extraction  0.1861  derived from  h n,  and  0 ∆  
0 ∆   extraction technology parameter  2.6356  calibrated from (A.I), 
(A.VI), (A.VIII) 
c s0   government consumption to output ratio   0.2041  data 
i s0  government investment to output ratio   0.0295  data 
t s0  government transfers to output ratio   0.1731  data 
y
0 τ   average income tax rate  0.3717  data 
c
0 τ   average consumption tax rate  0.2372  data 
a ρ   persistence parameter of  t A   0.9900 set 
g ρ   persistence parameter of 
c
t s   0.9933 estimation 
i ρ   persistence parameter of 
i
t s   0.8477 estimation 
t ρ   persistence parameter of 
t
t s   0.9871 estimation 
a σ   standard deviation of the innovation 
a
t ε   0.0063 set 
g σ   standard deviation of the innovation 
g
t ε   0.0121 estimation 
i σ   standard deviation of the innovation 
i
t ε   0.0073 estimation 
t σ   standard deviation of the innovation 
t
t ε   0.0071 estimation   23
 
Table 2: Long run 
 
variable data  average equilibrium  solution
y c/   0.5694 0.5771 
y i /   0.1812 0.1812 
h  0.3713 0.3651 
n  Na 0.8206 
nh  Na 0.2996 
∆   Na 0.1727 
k r   0.01004 0.0301 
y k /   Na 11.0172 
y k
g /  Na 1.7936 
b r   0.0089 0.0089 
y b/   2.3288 2.4 
c s0   0.2041 0.2122 
Notes: (i) Quarterly data over 1980:1-2003:4. (ii) na: non available. 
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Table 3: Comparative static properties in the long run: 
Effects of policy instruments on η  
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Table 4: Rent seeking results in member countries 
 








Austria  2.0544   (2)  0.8161  0.1491   (6)  5.8         (1)  15.5       (5)  47.22     (5) 
Belgium  2.2134   (4)  0.7595  0.1737   (8)  15.3       (6)  19.8       (8)  47.46     (4) 
Finland  2.0277   (1)  0.7781  0.1559   (7)  na  13.3       (2)  48.76     (3) 
France  2.2898   (5)  0.8455  0.1149   (3)  10.4       (3)  12.3       (1)  46.62     (6) 
Germany  2.8344   (6)  0.8498  0.1328   (5)  10.5       (4)  14.6       (4)  48.92     (2) 
Greece  3.7512 (11)  0.7641  0.3489 (11)  27.2     (10)  21.8     (10)  34.36   (11) 
Ireland  3.5282   (9)  0.8934  0.1327   (4)  7.8         (2)  20.6       (9)  44.37     (7) 
Italy  2.9589   (7)  0.8091  0.1848   (9)  20.4       (9)  19.6       (7)  40.90     (8) 
Netherlands  2.0737   (3)  0.9274  0.043     (1)  11.8       (5)  13.4       (3)  49.40     (1) 
Portugal  3.5336 (10)  0.8637  0.202   (10)  15.6       (7)  16.8       (6)  40.13   (10) 
Spain  3.3895   (8)  0.9203  0.1025   (2)  16.1       (8)  22.9     (11)  40.40     (9) 





1.  n  and ∆  are long run values, while  0 ∆  is calibrated value. Luxembourg is not included.    
2.  Both shadow economy indices are as percentages of GDP and are taken from Schneider and Enste (2000, Table 6). 
Index I is based on a “currency demand” method, and index II on a “physical input” method. The former refers to 
the period 1990-1993 and the latter to 1990. Schneider and Enste provide a detailed discussion of these methods. 
3.  The ICRG index is based on annual values for indicators of the quality of governance, corruption and violation of 
property rights over the period 1982-1997. It has been constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, 
University of Maryland, from monthly ICRG data provided by Political Risk Services. This index takes values 
within the range 0-50, with higher values indicating better institutional quality. Our reported numbers are the 
averages over 1982-1997. Knack and Keefer (1995) provide a detailed discussion of this index.    26
 
Table 5: Relative volatility,  y x s s x / ≡  
 
x  data full  model
model without
rent seeking 
basic RBC model 
c  0.9578 0.6222  0.5650  0.5469 
i  4.3504 2.4552  2.6715  3.0813 
h  0.5206 0.4986  0.0927  0.3276 
h y /   0.6357 0.5236  0.9103  0.6775 
w  0.8307 0.8971  0.9103  0.6775 
k r   0.2228 0.0306  0.0305  0.0311 
k   na 0.1415  0.1529  0.1803 
g k   na 0.1273  0.1251   
n  na 0.3930     
nh  na 0.1056     
y s   0.0084  0.0084 0.0084  0.0084 
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Table 6: Persistence  ) , ( 1 − t t x x ρ  
 
x  data full  model
model without
rent seeking 
basic RBC model 
y   0.8533 0.6859  0.6852  0.6859 
c  0.8339 0.6887  0.6907  0.6996 
i  0.8217 0.6691  0.6693  0.6802 
h  0.9512 0.6838  0.6808  0.6793 
h y /   0.6824 0.6905  0.6858  0.6929 
w  0.8230 0.6864  0.6858  0.6929 
K r   0.7707 0.6839  0.6826  0.6793 
k   na 0.9486  0.9479  0.9500 
g k   na 0.9511  0.9505   
n  na 0.6838     
nh  na 0.6838     
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Table 7: Co-movement  ) , ( i t t x y + ρ  
 
  Data  full model  
x  1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i   1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i  
c  0.6725 0.8013 0.7396 0.6682  0.9910  0.6936 
i  0.7541 0.8317 0.7115 0.6204  0.8929  0.6007 
h  0.7324 0.8327 0.8700 0.6886  0.9771  0.6483 
h y /   0.7401 0.8913 0.6256 0.6542  0.9793  0.6926 
w  0.1102 0.2777 0.3643 0.6835  0.9997  0.6883 
K r   0.1823 0.1313 0.0958 0.7067  0.9898  0.6442 
k   Na na  na  -0.2285 -0.0351 0.2300 
g k   Na na  na  -0.1371 -0.0371 0.1039 
n  Na  na na -0.6886 -0.9771 -0.6483 
nh  Na na  na  0.6886 0.9771 0.6483 
 
Table 7 (continued) 
  model without rent seeking basic RBC model 
x  1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i   1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i  
c  0.6582 0.9810 0.6908  0.6558  0.9925 0.7156 
i  0.5811 0.8319 0.5596  0.7024  0.9951 0.6545 
h  0.6825 0.9710 0.6424  0.7080 0.9894 0.6372 
h y /   0.6832 0.9997 0.6873  0.6699 0.9975 0.7042 
w  0.6832 0.9997 0.6873  0.6699  0.9975 0.7042 
k r   0.7048 0.9881 0.6409  0.7109 0.9835 0.6233 
k   -0.2036 -0.0212 0.2291 -0.2032 0.0110 0.3021 
g k   -0.1378 -0.0378 0.1035     
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Table 8a: Response to aggregate productivity shocks ( t A ) 
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Table 8b: Response to government consumption shocks (
c
t s ) 
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Table 8c: Response to government investment shocks (
i
t s ) 
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